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INTRODUCTION 
This brief is being filed by Respondent, Bear River 
Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter Bear River) in response to 
the Supplemental Brief filed by the Appellant herein pursuant to 
this Court's Order of May 18, 1988. 
Although this brief is limited to the issued addressed 
by Appellant in his Supplemental Brief, it is not the intention 
of Bear River to waive those issues addressed in its original 
brief. In fact, those issues, and the arguments set forth in 
Bear River's Reply Brief are expressly incorporated herein. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
To the extent that recent case law has not resolved the 
issues outlined in Respondent, Bear River's Reply Brief, this 
brief is limited to addressing the following issue: 
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Whether Appellant, Wright, is entitled to uninsured 
motorist coverage under the policy of insurance issued by Bear 
River. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bear River brought an action for declaratory judgment 
seeking a court determination of whether Bear River is 
responsible for the payment of benefits pursuant to an insurance 
policy issued to Appellant, Wright, The trial court, after 
considering all relevant facts and laws, granted Bear River's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.185-186) 
Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. The parties 
filed their respective briefs, when the Utah Supreme Court 
decided the case of Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 743 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987). Thereafter, this 
Court requested the parties to supplement their briefs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bear River would incorporate the Statement of Facts set 
forth in its original brief on pages 1 through 5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based upon the recent Utah Supreme Court decisions, the 
insurance policy issued by Bear River does not violate public 
policy, nor the applicable statutes. The only question then to 
be answered by this Court is whether Appellant, Wright, is 
entitled to uninsured motorist benefits. The answer must be an 
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unqualified ,!nofl. The reason this Court must affirm the trial 
Court's judgment and deny Appellant, Wright, uninsured motorist 
coverage is that the Utah Supreme Court in Hind v. Quilles and 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987), has 
so held. The Hind case and the instant case are identical. The 
issue raised by Appellant, Wright, was also raised by the 
Appellant in Hind. The arguments made by Appellant, Wright, are 
the same as those made by the Appellant in Hind. The arguments 
made by Bear River in this case are the same made by Bear River 
in Hind. 
There is no need for this Court to even consider the 
issue raised by Appellant, Wright. The court must merely follow 
Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Hind and affirm the trial court's 
judgment in this case. 
Uninsured motorist coverage rests with a vehicle, not 
with the insured. Appellant, Wright, %s attempting to attach 
such coverage to a vehicle for which he paid no premiums, for 
which he did not want insurance and th£ ownership of which he 
never acknowledged to Bear River until the accident occurred. 
This Court cannot allow Appellant, Wright, to steal 
uninsured motorist coverage. This Court must deny the relief 
requested by Appellant, Wright. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT, WRIGHT, IS NOT ENTITLED TO UNINSURED 
MOTORIST COVERAGE, 
The Appellant recognizes that the Clark, supra, case 
does render moot his first issue, i.e., the questioned exclusion 
does not violate public policy. 
The Appellant, however, fails to recognize that the 
Clark case and the case of Hind v. Quilles and Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Co. , 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987), also render moot the 
second issue raised by Appellant herein. 
Factually, the Hind case and the present case are 
indistinguishable. In Hind, as in the present case, Appellants 
were riding their uninsured motorcycle when they were involved in 
an accident with another uninsured motorist. In Hind, as in the 
present case, Bear River had issued a policy of insurance 
covering specific automobiles. That policy contained the same 
language and exclusions as the policy which is the subject of the 
dispute in this case. 
In Hind the Utah Supreme Court held that the policy in 
that case did not extend uninsured motorist coverage for vehicles 
owned by Appellants which were not included in the policy and for 
which no premium was paid. 
Appellant in this case is asking the Court to overrule 
Hind and hold that uninsured motorist coverage does extend to 
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vehicles owned by Appellant but for whichi he paid no premiums. 
Appellant, Wright, is begging this Court to overrule 
Hind despite giving the following testimony at his deposition: 
Q. Did you inform Bear River at the time you 
insured these vehicles that you were the 
owner of these motorcycles? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you ever requested your agent and 
informed him that you wete the owner of any 
motorcycles? 
A. No. 
Q. Who was your agent? 
A. Lamar Metcalf. 
Q. So you had never informed him that you were 
the owner of any motorcycles and you had 
never attempted to procure any insurance on 
any of these motorcycles? 
A. No. 
Q. Why didn't you buy any insurance on these 
motorcycles? 
A. Off highway motorcycles, I donft think it's 
necessary at all. 
Q. But what about this GL500 you were traveling 
back and forth to work on? 
A. The GL500 it wasn't required by law and I 
never bought the insurance on it. 
Q. You just never bothered? 
A. Just never bothered. 
Q. Never asked anybody and s|o on. But you knew 
you weren't paying any premium for that 
motorcycle? 
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A. Yes, I knew that. 
Q. And you knew you weren't paying any premium 
on the Honda CR 250? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you knew you weren't paying any premium 
on the Kawasaki? 
A. Right. 
Q. Was it your thinking that you would insure 
your two cars and then get the other three 
motorcycles free in case you had an accident? 
(Objection, That's argumentative and speculative.) 
A. Definitely not. 
Q. What was your thinking? 
A. On insurance of the motorcycles? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I had no thought towards the insuring of the 
motorcycle. My entire thinking was that it 
was not required by law, therefore the low 
purchase price of the motorcycle, I elected 
rather to go with the risk of driving it and 
possibly I --
Q. You had never discussed insurance 
requirements with anyone? 
A. No, sir." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Clark v. State Farm Mutual, 
743 P.2d at 1230, held as follows: 
"Thus, [uninsured motorist] coverage was intended 
to rest with the vehicle and not with the named 
insured, since the owner can opt in favor of 
uninsured motorist coverage on some vehicles and 
against it on others." 
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Appellant, Wright, opted against uninsured motorist 
coverage on his motorcycles, in fact, he opted against all 
insurance on his motorcycles. Appellant, Wright, is now, after 
the accident, attempting to shift the uninsured motorist coverage 
from a vehicle on which he opted in favor of uninsured motorist 
coverage to a vehicle on which he opted against such coverage. 
Appellant, Wright, is soliciting this Court to assist 
him in shifting, if not stealing, uninsured motorist coverage; 
but this Court cannot assist Appellant, Wright, nor can it aid 
and abet Appellant, Wright. Appellant, Wright made a choice and 
must now bear the consequence of that choice. This Court must 
affirm the trial Court's judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Appellant's pleas, the recent decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court render moot the issues raised in this appeal. 
In Clark v. State Farm Mutual Ayitomobile Insurance Co. , 
supra, that Court upheld the restrictions, such the restriction 
at issue herein, as neither violating the statute nor public 
policy. 
In Hind v. Quilles and Bear Riyer Mutual, supra, that 
Court was called upon to resolve the second issue raised by 
Appellant herein. The Hind case is factually indistinguishable 
from the present case and involved the judicial interpretation of 
the very exclusion which is the subject of this case. 
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This Court must follow the Utah Supreme Court's rulings 
in Clark and Hind, and based thereon, must affirm the trial 
Court's judgment by holding that the policy issued by Bear River 
specifically excludes uninsured motorist coverage for any vehicle 
owned by Appellant not included in the policy and for which he 
paid no premium. 
Respectfully submitted this j day of August, 1988. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
A 
Thomas A. Dufi 
Attorney for Bear Ry/k^Mutual 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
Brief to the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in 
an envelope addressed to: 
G. Steven Sullivan 
Attorney for Appellant, Wright 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
postage prepaid, this ¥ day of August, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company*s Brief of July, 1987, 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The primary issue presented on appeal is whether the 
trial court committed a reversible error in granting Bear River 
Mutual Insurance Company's (hereinafter Bear River) Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Directly related to that issue are questions 
concerning appellants' entitlement to uninsured motorist coverage 
under Bear River's policy and whether Appellants are entitled to 
stack their coverage. The final issue presented concerns Bear 
River's reduction of uninsured motorist coverage by the PIP 
benefits paid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following are undisputed fact?: 
1. On August 22, 1983, Appellants were involved in an 
accident with an automobile owned by defencjant, Porfidia Torres, 
and driven by defendant, Carmen I. Quilles. (R. 199, 266) 
2. That Appellants were riding their uninsured Honda 
motorcycle at the time of the collision, (ft. 199, 266) 
3. That defendants, Torres and Quilles, were 
uninsured motorists, as defined by §41-12-21.1, Utah Code 
Annotated, at the time of the accident. (R, 199) 
4. That at the time of the accident, Bear River had 
issued an insurance policy to Spencer H. $ind and Judy R. Hind 
covering two automobiles. (R. 265) 
5. That the Honda motorcycle, Which appellants were 
riding at the time of the accident, was not covered by that 
insurance policy, nor covered by any ottjer insurance policy, 
issued by Bear River to Appellants. (R. 185-190) 
6. That the insurance policy covering the two 
automobiles owned by appellants fully complied with the Safety 
Responsibility Act, §41-12-21, et seq. Utah Code Annotated. 
(R. 199) 
7. That the insurance policy sold to appellants was 
intended to cover only the two described automobiles owned by 
appellants. (R. 185-190) 
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8. That the insurance policy issued to appellants 
covering the two automobiles owned by them contained the 
following exclusion: (R. 189) 
"Exclusion. This policy does not apply under Part 
IV: 
"(a) to bodily injury to an insured while 
occupying an automobile (other than an insured 
automobile) owned by the named insured or a 
relative, or through being struck by such an 
automobile; . . ." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants' claim for relief, to say the least, is ill 
founded. The fundamental question presented by appellants1 
appeal is whether their claim for uninsured motorist benefits 
comes within the terms of Bear River's policy insuring 
appellants' two automobiles. 
Bear River issued a policy of insurance which 
designated the automobiles covered. Appellants paid a premium 
for each such automobile. Appellants, however, did not inform 
Bear River that they also owned a motorcycle; nor did appellants 
obtain insurance to insure their motorcycle. Appellants are 
asking this court to extend the uninsured motorist coverage of 
their automobile insurance to all other vehicles they own, 
including their motorcycle. Appellants want the benefit of 
insurance without having to pay any premiums for those benefits. 
The trial court correctly held that Bear River is not required to 
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provide uninsured motorist protection for the benefit of the 
appellants pursuant to the terms and provisions of its policy. 
The trial court further held that Bear River does not owe any 
obligation with respect to the claims for bodily injury and 
property damage arising out of appellants1 u£e of their uninsured 
motorcycle. The trial court also recognized that appellants were 
attempting to get a free ride and pass all responsibility for 
their action (or inaction) on Bear River. This court must also 
recognize this and affirm the trial court's decision. 
If this court concludes that appellants are entitled to 
a free ride, it must not allow them to invoke the doctrine of 
stacking to increase their benefits. Bear River has issued a 
policy of insurance to appellants which utilizes clear and 
unambiguous language to prevent stacking ahd to prevent double 
recovery. Therefore, if the court finds that appellants are 
entitled to uninsured motorist coverage for riding their 
uninsured motorcycle, it is submitted that pursuant to the terms 
of the policy, appellants cannot invoke the doctrine of stacking 
and that Bear River can offset any payments tnade to appellants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT GRANTED BEAR RIVER'S MOTION FOR SUGARY 
JUDGMENT. 
In reviewing a trial court's grant of a summary 
judgment in a contractual dispute, the Utah Supreme Court in Gump 
& Ayers Real Estate, Inc. v. Domcoy Investors, 733 P.2d 128-129 
(Utah 1987) recently held as follows: 
"Under well settled standards of review, we view 
the evidence before us in a light most favorable 
to defendants and uphold the summary judgment only 
if plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 56(c). In construing contractual language, 
we need not defer to the trial court, Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) (Citation 
omitted), but affirm the trial court so long as 
the contract terms are complete, clear and 
unambiguous. Colonial Leasing v. Larson Brothers, 
731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1586).,f 
In the instant case, the terms of the contract are 
complete, clear and unambiguous. Appellants purchased insurance 
coverage from Bear River for their two automobiles. Appellants 
paid the premiums and Bear River issued the policies of 
insurance. This policy provided that uninsured motorist coverage 
does not apply: 
"to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an 
automobile (other than an insured automobile) , 
owned by the named insured or a relative or 
through being struck by such an automobile." 
There is no doubt appellants owned the motorcycle they 
were riding at the time of the accident. It is undisputed that 
appellants failed to purchase any insurance for their motorcycle 
from Bear River or any other insurance company. 
-5-
What Appellants are really asking this court to do is 
to reward them for failing to purchase insurance on their 
motorcycle and to punish Bear River for issuing insurance on 
appellants1 two automobiles. The language of the contract 
between appellants and Bear River is complete, clear and 
unambiguous. The contract covered appellants' two automobiles 
and clearly excluded other vehicles owned by them* For these 
reasons this court must affirm the trial courtfs decision 
granting Bear River's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COVERAGE UNDER THE 
UNINSURED MOTORIST PROVISION OF TtiE POLICY ISSUED 
BY BEAR RIVER: 
Appellants claim they are entitled to uninsured 
motorist coverage under the policy issued tb Bear River insuring 
their two automobiles. In support of their claim, they cite this 
court to Coates v. American Economy Insurance Company, 627 P. 2d 
91 (Utah 1981) and Allstate Insurance Company v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980). 
In Allstate the Utah Supreme Court concluded that ftthe 
No-Fault Act, while ostensibly distinct from the Safety 
Responsibility Act, (§41-12-1, et seq.), expressly incorporates 
the provision of the latter act, (those setting out the 
'qualifications1 of an insurance policy under that act) into its 
security requirements11 Allstate Insurance Company v. United 
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Sta tes F i d e l i t y & Guaranty Company, supra, a t 332. This 
qua l i fy ing language, the court concluded, i s found pr imar i ly in 
§41-12-21. Id . 
In t h e i r b r i e f on page 5 appe l lan t s s t r e t c h tha t 
conclusion and argue tha t §41-12-21.1 i s a l so incorporated in the 
No-Fault Act. Appel lants 1 argument i s n e i t h e r supported by the 
language of the No-Fault Act nor by the Utah Supreme Court 
op in ions . 
Appellants continue along the wrong path by arguing 
t h a t Coates a l so supports t h e i r claim. Appellants refuse to 
acknowledge the fundamental d i f fe rence between Coates and the 
presen t case . F i r s t , in Coates the Utah Supreme Court was 
addressing i s sues concerning the No-Fault Act. Whereas the 
i n s t a n t case concerns the Uninsured Motoris t Act. Second, the 
insured in Coates was dr iv ing a motorcycle not owned by him. 
Bear R ive r ' s pol icy of insurance provides for insurance coverage 
for a non-owned d r i v e r , as in the Coates case . Bear R ive r ' s 
p o l i c y , as with a l l o ther insurance c a r r i e r s ' p o l i c i e s , uniformly 
includes coverage for a non-owned veh ic le or motorcycle operated 
by the insured , but they uniformly exclude coverage for an owned 
I t should be noted that §41-12-21(b)(1) requires that a l l l i a b i l i t y insurance 
designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference a l l motor 
vehicles covered. The policy issued to Appellants by Bear River did not 
designate by description or appropriate reference their motorcycle because 
they failed to inform Bear River of the fact that they owned the motorcycle. 
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vehicle or motorcycle operated by an insured for benefits of 
coverage for which no premium was paid. The motorcycle that the 
plaintiff was driving was his own uninsured motorcycle. IcL at 
93. Based on these differences and upon this court !s prior 
decisions, the trial courtfs decision granting Bear Riverfs 
Motion for Summary Judgment must be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE FACT THAT APPELLANTS WERE RIDING THEIR OWN 
UNINSURED MOTORCYCLE DOES NOT ENTITLE THEM~TO 
-UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE UNDER BEAR RIVER"7? 
POLICY OF INSURANCE" 
There is no question that Bear River issued a policy of 
automobile insurance providing various tfypes of coverage, 
including uninsured motorist coverage to appellants. That 
insurance policy covered two automobiles oVned by appellants, 
to-wit: 
1. 1972 GMC 3/4 pickup truck, ID No. 
TCE245502193, 
2. 1973 Cadillac Deville, ID No. 6D47R3G155465 
(R. 185) 
There is also no question that th^ uninsured motorist 
coverage provided by Bear River was in full compliance with 
§41-12-21.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. (R. 199) 
The purpose of this type of coverage has been defined 
as follows-. 
"Clearly, the goal is to provide protection to a 
certain class of injured persons ijn the event of 
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physical injury to covered persons where 
circumstances dictate that no coverage exists for 
compensation of their injuries. 
It has been stated that uninsured motorist 
coverage was intended to provide financial 
recompense to innocent persons and dependents who 
are injured or killed because of the wrongful 
conduct of an uninsured motorist." Couch on 
Insurance, 2d (Rev. Ed.) §45: 624. 
The Uninsured Motorist Act was intended to cover all 
motor vehicles. The term ffmotor vehicles" is defined in 
§41-12-l(e) as follows: 
"Motor vehicle means every self-propelled vehicle 
which is designed for use upon a highway, 
including trailers and semi-trailers designed for 
use with such vehicles (except traction engines, 
road rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes, power 
shovels and well drillers) and every vehicle which 
is propelled by electric power obtained by 
overhead wires, but not operated upon rails." 
The coverage which was sold to appellants was in accord 
with said act (R. 199) and was intended to cover only the two 
described motor vehicles. (R. 185) Part IV of the insurance 
policy, Protection Against Uninsured Motorist Coverage, purchased 
by appellants, provides as follows: 
"Coverage J—Uninsured Motorists (damages for 
bodily injury) to pay all sums which the insured 
or his legal representative shall be legally 
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or 
operator of an uninsured automobile because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including 
death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called 
'bodily injury* sustained by the insured, caused 
by accident and arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; 
provided, for the purposes of this coverage, 
determination as to whether the insured or such 
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representative is legally entitled to recover such 
damages and if so the amount thereof shall be made 
by agreement between the insured or such 
representative and the company or, if they fail to 
agree, by arbitration/1 (R. 157) 
Clearly, the quoted coverage was intended to protect 
the appellants in the event they were injured in an accident 
involving an uninsured motorist. The quoted coverage, however, 
is subject to the following exclusion: 
"Exclusions. This policy does hot apply under 
Part IV: 
(a) to bodily injury to the insured while 
occupying the automobile (other than an insured 
automobile) owned by the named insured or a 
relative, or through being struck by such an 
automobile; . . ." (R. 157) 
There is no question that at the time of the accident 
the appellants were riding an uninsured motorcycle which they 
owned. By asking this court to set aside the judgment entered by 
the trial court, they are in essence, asking this court to reward 
them for their failure to purchase insurance for their motorcycle 
and to further reward them for riding an uninsured motorcycle on 
the streets of this state. 
Appellants in their brief on page! 6 cite this court to 
cases holding that the term "automobile'^ does not encompass 
"motorcycle", but the majority of the cas^s hold that the term 
"automobile" does encompass "motorcycle". See 46 ALR 4th, 765 
and cases cited therein. 
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In Brackett v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 486 A.2d 
1188 (Me. 1985), the insured was injured while riding his 
uninsured motorcycle. The insured, just like appellants, only 
purchased insurance for his automobile. In affirming the trial 
court's decision, denying the insured such coverage, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine stated that: 
"Uninsured motorist coverage on one of a number of 
vehicles owned by an insured does not extend the 
benefits of such coverage, for no premium, to all 
other vehicles owned by that insured." 
The obviously ludicrous conclusion of appellants1 
proposition that they are entitled to uninsured motorist coverage 
is best demonstrated by the following hypothetical case: A 
person could insure his automobile and then purchase an infinite 
number of motorcycles to be used by himself and/or others who 
fall within the definition of "insured11 under such insurance, and 
then that person could expect all such insureds to be entitled to 
uninsured motorist coverage if they are involved in an accident 
with an uninsured motorist while riding one of the many 
motorcycles. The mere thought of such an occurrence, shakes 
one's conscience and sense of fairness. Unless this court 
affirms the trial court's decision, insurance companies, like 
Bear River, who offer insurance in compliance with the laws of 
this state will be expected to insure not only the designated 
vehicles but, perhaps, an entire fleet of motorcycles. Insureds, 
like appellants, can then conceal the ownership of these 
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motorcycles because they will be insured eyen though they pay no 
premiums to insure their fleet of motorcycles. 
For these reasons, this court must affirm the trial 
court's decision granting Bear River's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
POINT IV 
THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE AND POLICY OF UNINSURED 
MOTORIST COVERAGE WILL BE .DEFEATED UNLESS THIS' 
COURT AFFIRMS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION: 
Uninsured motorist coverage is intended to protect 
innocent persons who are impaired by uninsured motorists. As the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. 
Call, 712 P.2d 231-234 (Utah 1985) a legislative action in 
enacting minimal automobile insurance coverages reflects a public 
policy to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents. 
That public policy is contrary to appellants1 argument 
that the public policy is to protect ! persons who ride an 
uninsured motorcycle on the streets of tttis state. By driving 
their motorcycle without obtaining any insurance thereon, 
appellants remove themselves from the class of innocent victims 
intended to be protected by uninsured motorist coverage. By 
driving their motorcycle without any insurance, appellants joined 
the class of persons whom public policyf was not intended to 
protect. Shipley v. American Standard Insurance Company, 185 NW 
238 (Neb. 1968). 
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Appellants may be victims, but they certainly are not 
innocent victims. They have not proffered, nor can they proffer, 
any excuse for their neglect of failing to insure their motor-
cycle. The only possible explanation for their neglect is that 
they hoped to defraud Bear River and to obtain coverage without 
paying any premiums. 
The laws of this state require appellants, as owners of 
a motorcycle, to purchase insurance for their motorcycle before 
driving it upon public roads. The laws of this state further 
provide that insurers, such as Bear River, provide certain types 
of coverage with certain minimum limits. The public policy 
underlying these laws is to protect innocent victims of 
automobile accidents. 
So long as the statutory law and public policy are not 
violated and insurer has the right to contract with an insured as 
to the risks it will and will not assume. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange v. Call, supra, at 233. 
Bear River has complied with the statutory law and the 
public policy requirements. If this court reverses the trial 
court's decision, Bear River will be the innocent victim and 
appellants will be rewarded for violating statutory law and 
public policy. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INVOKE THE DOCTRINE 
OF STACKtNG TO INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF THElR 
RECOVERY. 
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Even if appellants are deemed insured under uninsured 
motorist coverage, they may not invoke the doctrine of stacking 
to increase the amount of their recovery. 
In construction and interpretation of insurance 
policies, the Utah Supreme Court has long subscribed to one of 
the cardinal rules of construction. Th4t rule provides as 
follows: 
"If an insurance policy is ambiguous or uncertain, 
so that it is fairly susceptible to different 
interpretations, any doubt should be resolved in 
favor of insurance coverage.11 American Casualty 
Company of Redding Pennsylvania v. Eagle Star 
Insurance Company Ltd., 5bS F773 731-734 (Utah 
T577T: 
The court continued by stating that: 
"The converse of this is also tr^ ie: that unless 
there is some ambiguity or uncertainty, the policy 
should be enforced according to its terms." Id. 
The validity of this rule was reaffirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance v. Commercial 
Assurance, 606 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1980). 
The insurance policy in question provides as follows: 
"Limits of Liability. 
(a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist 
coverage stated in the declarations as 
applicable to each person is the limit of the 
company's liability for all damages, includ-
ing damages for care or loss of services, 
because of bodily injury sustained by one 
person as a result of any one accident and, 
subject to the above provision respecting 
each person, the limit or liability stated in 
the declaration as applicable to each 
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accident is the total limit of the company's 
liability for all damages, including damages 
for care or loss of services because of 
bodily injury sustained by two or more 
persons as a result of any one accident," 
(emphasis added) 
Applying the cardinal rule of construction, and the 
reasoning expressed by the courts as cited below, it is 
respectfully submitted that Bear River's policy clearly and 
unambiguously limits liability for injury to two or more persons 
as a result of one accident under the uninsured motorist 
provision to the sum of $40,000.00. The mere fact that two 
automobiles are covered under the policy and that two premiums 
are paid (one premium for each automobile) does not warrant 
construing the policy to allow stacking. Given the terms 
employed in the "limits of liability" clause the ordinary and 
accepted meaning, it is incomprehensible how a reasonable person 
could interpret that clause in any other way than is suggested 
herein. i.e., stacking is not permitted under this policy.2 
The general rule with respect to the doctrine of 
stacking is stated in Appleman, Insurance Law Practice, §5106, 
"Thou Shalt Not Stack". A few of the decisions adhering to the 
rule against stacking, or accumulation of uninsured motorist 
coverage, used the correct ruling, that is, the actual exposure 
2Although not applicable to the instant case, Section 31A-22-305(6), Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage, which was enacted by the Utah State Legislature in 1986, 
expressly prohibits stacking. 
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of an insurer multiplied by the number of vehicles. Different 
persons will be driving them on different occasions and the risk 
is thereby multiplied, so that separate coverage must be carried 
on each, whenever that particular vehicle is used. 
In Blansett v. American Employees Insurance Company, 
652 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1981), the in$ured had purchased 
automobile insurance to cover seven vehicles. The insured 
suffered injuries in an accident with two uninsured motorists. 
The court held that insured was limited to $110,000.00, the policy 
limit. The court based its holding upon the language of the 
policy. The policy in question limited insurer's liability to 
$10,000.00 each person arid specifically limited liability to said 
amount regardless of the number of vehicles to the policy 
applied. Id. at 536-536. 
Another court, in Hampton v. Allstate Insurance 
Company, 616 P.2d 778 (Ariz. 1980), the insured had purchased one 
automobile insurance policy to cover his tt\ree automobiles. The 
policy contained an express limit to th^ insurer's liability 
under the uninsured motorist coverage. The|court recognized that 
various jurisdictions had reached different conclusions; but, 
rejected the insured's argument that he should be able to stack 
the coverage. To support its conclusion, the court stated: 
"When all the provisions of the policy are 
considered, it clearly limits Allstatefs liability 
for damages to any one person as 
accident under the uninsured motporist provisions 
a result of one 
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to the sum of $15,000.00 and the fact that three 
of the vehicles are described and three premiums 
charged, does not warrant construing the policy to 
allow stacking." Id. at 780. 
The court also rejected the insured's public policy by 
citing State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. 
Williams, 600 P.2d 759 (Ariz. 1979). In the Williams case the 
court, in no uncertain terms, exposed the fallacy of the public 
policy argument by stating as follows: 
"This has great populous appeal, but overlooks 
what risk was being insured against and what the 
insurance contract provided. Under these 
policies, each automobile was insured and it is 
theoretically possible that at one given moment 
all three vehicles could be operating and in three 
individual accidents, be struck by three uninsured 
motorists. In such case each operator would have 
$10,000.00 coverage under each policy. This was 
the risk insured against and this is what the 
premium was paid for. Under the terms of the 
policy, the risk insured and the premium received 
was not to afford coverage of $30,000.00 for one 
accident.11 Id. at 763. 
Other jurisdictions have also held that the payment of 
multiple premiums was not determinative of an insured's right to 
multiple insured motorist coverages in a policy covering more 
than one vehicle owned by an individual. See Nenke v. County 
Mutual Insurance Company, 401 NE 2d. 539 (IL 1980); State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Company v. Short, 603 SW 2d 496 (KY 1980); 
Grimes v. Concord General Mutual Insurance Company, 422 A.2d 1313 
(NH 1980); Indiana Insurance Company v. Ivers, 395 NE 2d 820 
(IN 1979); and Castle v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 448 
P.2d 357 (OR 1968). 
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Based on this overwhelming majority appellants must not 
be allowed to invoke the doctrine of stacking to increase their 
recovery, if this court determines that they are entitled to 
recover at all. 
POINT VI 
THE INSURANCE POLICY AT ISSUE PERMITS BEAR RIVER 
TO REDUCE tTS LIABILITY UNOER THE UTOSURES 
MOTORISTS COVERAGE 6Y ALL SUMS PAtfl UNDER OTtiER 
AVAILABLE COVERAGEST 
The policy purchased by appellants contained the 
following limits of liability: 
"(b) Any amount payable under the terms of this 
Part because of bodily injury sustained in an 
accident by a person who is an insured under this 
Part shall be reduced by 
(1) all sums paid on account of such bodily injury 
by or on behalf of (i) the ownejr of operator of 
the uninsured automobile and (ii) any other person 
or organization jointly or Severally liable 
together with such owner or operator for such 
bodily injury including all sums paid under 
Coverage A, and 
(2) the amount paid and the present value of all 
amounts payable on account of siich bodily injury 
under any workmen's compensation law, disability 
benefits law or any similar law. 
(c) Any payment made under this Part to or for any 
insured shall be applied in Reduction of the 
amount of damages which he ma^ be entitled to 
recover from any person insured lender Coverage A. 
(d) The company shall not be obligated to pay 
under this coverage that part of the damages which 
the insured may be entitled to j recover from the 
owner or operator of an uninsured automobile which 
represents expenses for medical services paid or 
payable under Part II." (R. 157) 
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In the instant case, Bear River has paid insured 
pursuant to the terms of said policy. Applying the general rule 
regarding clear and unambiguous language of a policy, it is 
submitted that Bear River, by means of the provision quoted, has 
reduced its liability by the amount of any sums paid to 
appellants, pursuant to the other coverages of the policy in 
question. 
Bear River is aware that the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that: 
"Any attempt to reduce the amount specified (in 
§41-12-21.1 and §41-12-5) would be contrary to the 
statute." Thamert v. Continental Casaulty 
Company, 621 P.2d 702-704 (1980). 
It is hereby submitted, however, that the insurance 
policy in question is neither contrary to said statute nor public 
policy. 
The Utah Legislature, in adopting the legislation 
requiring automobile insurance policies to offer uninsured 
motorist coverage has attempted to put an injured insured in the 
same financial position that he would have been in had the 
tortfeasor been insured. To achieve this goal, the legislature 
has mandated that such coverage must have protection in amounts 
of not less than $20,000 per person and $40,000 per occurrence. 
The statute only mandates that an insurer may not issue 
a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance without a provision 
for uninsured motorist protection. The statute, however, does 
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not mandate that the insured purchase such coverage. An insured 
is afforded the opportunity to reject such coverage. Li. at 705. 
In this case the insured exercised his statutory right to 
partially reject the uninsured motorist protection by exercising 
his freedom to contract and limit the uninsured motorist coverage 
by a sum equal to other benefits. Id. 
The proposition, permitting a setoff pursuant to the 
quoted limits of liability clause asserted herein, has been 
adopted by courts of other jurisdictions. See Robinson v. 
Allstate Insurance Company, 267 So. 2d 257 (La. 1972), insurer 
could deduct from $5,000 coverage the suqi of $2,000 which had 
been paid under medical payments coverage; Hackman v. American 
Mutual Liability Insurance Company, 261 A.2d 433 (N.H. 1970), the 
court upheld a limiting clause where insured's recovery of 
benefits was as complete as the uninsured motorist statute 
contemplated; Sullivan v. Dairyland Insurance Company, 649 P.2d 
1357 (Nv. 1982), setoff clause requiring insured to repay 
benefits received under policy's medical expense coverage out of 
recovery made under policy's uninsured motorist coverage was 
valid since it operated to prevent double recovery; and State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Summerholder, 671 
P.2d 1194 (Or. 1983), where insurer w^s entitled to offset 
personal injury protection benefits paid under one policy against 
liability limits available under a second policy. 
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The limit of liability quoted above satisfies two major 
goals of the uninsured motorist coverage. First, it assures that 
an insured will receive no less than the statutory limits. 
Second it prevents the insured from recovering twice for the same 
injury. In this case, the parties expressed their intent to be 
bound by the statutory limit. To deny the setoff for the amount 
paid to the appellants would contradict, that which the parties 
intended, and would afford appellants a double recovery, 
something which the law avoids. Therefore, if the court finds 
that appellants are entitled to the coverage provided under the 
uninsured motorist provision, it is submitted, that Bear River 
must be afforded the opportunity to offset from the benefits 
under such coverage, any amounts paid to appellants pursuant to 
other provisions of the policy in question. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants are asking the court to extend the insurance 
they purchased for their two automobiles to cover their 
motorcycle. Appellants chose to drive their motorcycle on the 
streets of this state without insuring it. In essence, 
appellants are asking to be rewarded by this court, for breaking 
the law, i.e. failing to insure their motorcycle. Appellants 
cannot reasonably argue that they expected their automobile 
insurance to also cover their motorcycle. Affording the 
appellants the relief they seek would open a "pandora's box" that 
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must remain closed. 
Appellants must also be denied their request to stack 
the uninsured motorist coverage. The language of the policy is 
clear and unambiguous with respect to Bear River's liability. In 
the absence of ambiguous language, this court must enforce the 
policy according to its terms and provisions. 
Finally, the policy clearly limits Bear River's 
liability by affording an offset of the uninsured motorist 
benefits for any benefits paid under other cpverages. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and based upon 
applicable law, Bear River respectfully requests that this court 
affirm the trial court's decision and dismiss appellants' appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1987. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Bear River Mutual 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
Brief to the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in 
an envelope addressed to: 
Frederick N. Green 
Attorney for Appellants 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, this day of July, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order and Judgment 
2. Insurance Policy 
3. Uninsured Motorists Coverage Statute, §41-12-21.1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 
4. §41-12-21, Utah Code Annotated 
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927) 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Intervening Defendant 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-8020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SPENCER J. HIND and ) 
JUDY R. HIND, ) 
Plaintiffs, i 
vs. ] 
CARMEN I. QUILLES aka ] 
CARMEN GOMEZ QUILLES and ; 
PROFIDIA TORRES, ) 
Defendants, ] 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL ] 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ] 
Intervening Plaintiff." 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. Q84-39i!r*-
i (Judge Frank G. Noel) 
] ^Y-3?yt> 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable Jay E. Banks, one of the judges of 
the above entitled court, on the 25th day of November, 1985, on 
the motion of Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, Intervening 
Plaintiff, for Summary Judgment. Thomas A. Duffin appearing for 
and on behalf of Intervening Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Co., and Frederick N. Green appearing for and on behalf 
of plaintiffs, Spencer H. Hind and Judy R. Hind, whereupon the 
QGOS64 
-'AN 2 1S37 
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court having heard the respective arguments of the parties and 
having further examined the insurance policy of Intervening 
Plaintiff, the deposition of plaintiffs, the ihemoranda filed by 
counsel, the affidavit of Mindy Starley of Bear River Mutual, and 
having taken the matter under advisement and having found that 
there is no genuine issue of fact to be submitted to a trial 
court on the contract of insurance between intervening plaintiff, 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and plaintiffs, Spencer H. 
Hind and Judy R. Hind. The matter having been submitted, the 
court now concludes that the Intervening Plaintiff, Bear River 
Mutual Insurance Company, is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Now, therefore, on motion of Thomas A. Duffin, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Intervening Plaintiff1s Motion for Summary judgment is in all 
respects granted and plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the intervening plaintiff, 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, on its policy issued to the 
plaintiffs, Spencer H. Hind and Judy R. Hind, on the 22nd day of 
August, 1983, on their 1970 GMC 3/4 ton Pickup truck and 1973 
Cadillac, is not required to provide uninsured motorist protec-
tion for the benefit of the plaintiffs pursuant to the terms and 
provisions of its policy and does not owe any obligation of 
o^u 
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defense or payment with respect to the claims for bodily injury 
and property damage arising out of the use of their motorcycle, 
on August 22, 1983, involved in an accident on August 29, 1983, 
with defendant, Carmen I. Quilles. -*r~s? i ^ ^ l 
Dated this ^ L day of Ueveafe-er-;—198G .* 
BY THE COURT: 
<<^Lc~-
JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DtXON HINCLEY 
ClerV 
By ?lphi 
!*ar 8"r\- UJuluai 3nsuran Inmpang 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POD SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
,.,m Part Two. This Declarations caqe with "Policv Provis«ons-Parr Cr ie" completes the below numbered 
Policy Period; p> r»c »*M(O '»sutio *s smto • i t i . " Ffcm- 22 AUG 1983 to 22 FEB 1984 
DECLARATIONS 
JCY C39637 DUPLICATE 
• HIND, SPENCER 
• 959 SOUTH LINCOLN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84105 
jSanted injured 
^OORESS 
(Number & Street. Town. County & State) 
Occupation of the named insured is
 mmm 
3. The insurance afforded is only with resqect to sucn of the following coverages as are indicated by specific premium charge or charges. On eacn described! 
owned automobile or any automobile acquired as a replacement thereof, the insurance afforded is orjly with respect to such coverages as are indicated lor eachj 
described automobile by specific premium charge or charges. The limit 0* the company s liability against each such coverage shall be as stated herein, subject] 
to all the terms of this policy having reference thereto. 
SCOTT BRUDERER 
2019 LEONARD CIRCLE 
SANDY, ITT AH 8407Q 
943-7453 (Agent 
Address Town and State 
4
- Description of the Automobile and facts respecting its purchase by the Applicant: 
Make of Car No. 
Cyi. 
Type of Body and 
Number of Ooors 
Sana* No. or Motor No. 
identification No. 
insurance 
Symbol 
m 72 -£HC_ V& T PIT TCE245502193 
•2! 
.12. CAirrn,AC DKVTT.T.P: 6D47R3G155465 
«rr 
Garage: The owned automobile will be principally garaged in the town or city designated in Item I above unless otherwise stated herein ' 
Less Payee: Any loss under Part III is payable as interest may appear to the named insured and <••»-« »»<> . M . c n - n . t t . . . l o » , 
Auto No. ' i Memo Cooy 1 stud 
• re* Q No 
jS«t loss Pnaaie CUuit) 
on reverse sioe. 
COVERAGES UMTS OF LIABILITY Car ^ 1 
PREMIUMS 
Car n Car ^3 
Part I A Bodily Injury Liability 2 5 / 5 0 
B Property Oamage Liability 
iPift II j C Personal ln|urv Protection 
far t III / £ Collision 
0 (1) Comprehensive (eictuding collision) 
(2) Personal Effects (fire & Lightning) 
F Fire G Theft H Combined Add'l 
I Towing 4 Labor Costs 
thousand dollars each person 
thousand dollars each occurrence! 14.00 $ 14.00 j j 
15. thousand dollars each occurrence! ? ? . 0 0 
(1) Actual Cash Value less } Oedi 
11.00 
(2) S100.00 Any One Occurrence 
Actual Cash Value less % Oed 
Actual Cash Value 
Part IV J Uninsured Motorists (Bodily Injury Only) 
$25.00 per Disablement 
20 thousand dollars eacn person 
40 thousand dollars each accident 
1NCLU. 
2 2 . 0 0 
11,00 $ 
1NCLU. 
5 
INCLU. 
NOTICE: It is agreed that any Physical Damage Insurance afforded by the policy 
is sudiect to the following additional exclusions: 
(1) Stereo taoes and any tape holders or carrying cases are not covered 
in this policy. Stereo ploying units ^re not covered m this policy unless 
installed as original equipment by factory or unless a premium charge is 
indicated aoove the Comprehensive premium. 
(2) This insurance does not apply to loss of. or damage to any sound re-
ceiving or sound receiving 3nd transmitting equipment cesigned for use as 
a citizen's band radio, two-way mooile radio or teiepnone, or scanning 
monitor receiver, including any accessories and antennas, unless factory 
installed in an owned automobile. 
Total 
Each Car $ 4 7 . 0 0 j 47.00 
TOTAL ALL CARS J 94.00 
6. I'his ooliov »s issued on me sasis mat io insurer "as canceled or refused insur-
ance during trie oast 3 years 
• * i 3 S £ N C E CF AN £Nt»Y MfA.NS NO j X C £ a T ' O N " 
Countersigned by . 
Authorised fttortstfttativt 
XTTOMOSILS -
Pfcytfcoi Damage) 
LOSS PAYABLE .CLAUSE 
NAUA N o / 5 1 — Ed'HoA. June. 1951 
V - . i \ i i -i.n«r.^i,.... "in*. *.saer T."*e pcUcy ire:! a* payc&le c i intstsst nay oasaar :o tne .ass ?a-*ee *an»«i in ?ne Operations ana thi» 
•tvrrmce 9» to -no irrerest OT tne aenmeni lessor, Corattianai v^ncsr ar Mo'»e;agee o# At»ign«*> of 8a»«m«nr lessor Conaitionai Vendor or Mort-
- J O I J •*>»#*»Jn' caJ'ed ' *e t^njfoider* thail nor b« invalidated bv env ac* or-«»eg'»ct of »he lessee. Mortgage sr - "«« ' ?f the wi»hin £tscibed 
vttomobile nor by any j*»ange in, the tttte-acawaership of the property: prev'aed. now«*#r •not •*« con^eruo*. *^b«xz»«w««9 OP secretion by 
*e J.5«e*.. Mortgagor cr Purchaser in possesion of the praeerty Insured vndsr a bcilmen* leose«, conditional sate, mortgage or other encunv. 
t&nzM «*» *of. 40««r«a »nae' »«*ch pe*i<y»:<«mes* *pe<U*ca«y ">*«*«e« sga*n%t ana-premt*.?! paid tnererar; ono piov«aea, also, that in cat* the lessee. 
Mortgagor or Owntf shall neglect to pay any premium duo under such policy the-lienhoidee shait, on demand, pay the tamo.- •-•• 
.~y.H. t ;,«•.« ... A| :'| . i : . T J i \ i l . . s* * K * *":•* ft *l i •* 
?rovid«d also, that Ihe Lienholder thai! notify/.lhe company, of any.change of ownership or increase of haxard which shall come to tho 
no**iedga of" said* Ltoftholder and, unlets permitted by'such policy, "i snefl bo noted thereon ard tho Lien holder shall, on demand, pay thd 
•rtmium for such^ncreoseanoxara for the iirm of'the- «»• :«ereof> otherwise s*cn" ao.;cy snail bo null and void. i * 
c ' . • . * * • • _ ' 0 _ -
Tho comoany reserves tho right to> cancer sucn policy, at. any time as provided by*~its~ terms'." but in such cose the company snail notify the 
ienholder when not leu than ten days, thereafter -such cancellation. sitaU. fee-effective as. to. the interest of said Lienhaider tn«r«tn ana the 
onoany shall hove tne '»ght on like notice, to cancel fhtV agreement. -»•-«•-.• •
 t-
if the ,-vswred fa.U fa render proof of 'oss w.fhi.i the tine granted in tho pollcv cenaitfons. sucn lienhoider mall do so within sixty days 
^ • ' • v * * ' , n ?ar*n snd -nenner as provided by the poiicy, end. fyrrhsr, shall be'subiecf to the provisions of the policy resating to appreisai anr? 
;
«*»e of ?ay*n.er.t end ar.bringing suit.. ' . « . . . . . — . . . — _''. . '*', ',. .—- . . .. ^ 
^"»f»'i"^r *he cs^c^rsy shell pay t^e Lienhaider any sum for loss or aamage yraer such policy and shall claim that, as to the Lessee, Mort-
agoc or Owner no noOility therefor existed, »he company snaii, to the, extent of sucn payeient, be thereupon legally subrogated to ail the rights 
» **w perW-to wnop rum aoymenrrfratt be mode*, under aft securities Held as collateral to* the dtbf, or may at its option'.-pay to* the Li en holder 
h* «#ho!* principal dim of to grow di'p on the mortgage with interest; ond shall thereuoon receive o full assignment and transfer of the mortgage 
ma "of aiJ such other securities? but no sab'ogation trail impair the. right*of the Uenhoider to recover the full amount of its claim. 
Notning ne*etn*eoa.'atnea, shall be nmio" to vary, alter, waive, or, extend any, ai.,!/»e terms, conditions; agreements OF limitations oiiuch policy, 
i?h*r than «as coov^ t*os*d. - • 
A 4153 
NON-ASSESSABLE MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY 
Salt Lake City. Utah 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
(A Mutual Insurance Company, hereinafter called the company) 
Agrees with the insured, named in the declarations made a part hereof, in consideration of the payment of the premium and m reliance upon the statements in the 
declarations and subject to all of the terms of this policy: DADT I it Ami ITV 
Coverage A—Bodily Injury Liability; Coverage B—Property Damage Liability. To pay on 
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of: 
A. bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter 
called "bodily injury," sustained by any person; 
B. injury to or destruction of property, including loss of use thereof, hereinafter 
called "property damage"; 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the owned automobile or any non-
owned automobile, and the company shall defend any suit alleging such bodily injury or 
property damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this 
policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent; but 
the company may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it 
deems expedient. 
Definitions. Under Part I: 
"named insured" means the individual named in item 1 of the declarations and als. 
includes his spouse, if a resident of the same household; 
"insured" means a person or organization described under "Persons Insured"; 
"relative" means a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household; 
"owned automobile" means (a) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile described in this policy for which 
a specific premium charge indicates that coverage is afforded, 
(b) a trailer owned by the named insured. 
(c) A private passenger, farm or utility automobile ownership of which is acquired the 
named insured during the policy period, provided 
(1) it replaces an owned automobile as defined in (a) above, or 
Supplementary Payments. To pay, in addition to the applicable limits of liability: (a) all expenses incurred by the company, ail costs taxed against the insured in any 
such suit and all interest on the entire amount of any judgment therein which 
accrues after entry of the judgment and before the company has-paid or tendered 
or deposited in court that part of the judgment which does not exceed the limit of 
the company s liability thereon: 
(b) premiums on appeal bonds required in any such suit, premiums on bonds to release 
attachments for an amount not in excess of the applicable limit of liability of this 
poticy and the cost of bail bonds required of the insured because of accident or 
traffic law violation arising out of the use of an automobile insured hereunder not 
to exceed $100 per bail bond, but without any obligation to apply for or furnish 
any such bonds. (c) expenses incurred by the insured for such immediate medical and surgical relief to 
others as shall be imperative at the time of an accident involving an automobile 
insured hereunder and not due to war; 
ail reasonable expenses, other than loss of earnings, incurred by the insured at 
the comoany s request. 
Persons Insured. The following are insured under Part I* 
\i) with respect to the owned automobile. 
(1) the named insured and any resident of the same household. (2) any other person using such automobile with the permission of the named in-
sured provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual 
use thereof is within the scope of such permission, and 
(3) any other person or organization but only with respect to his or its liability 
because of acts or omissions of an insured under (a) ( I ) or (2) above. (b) with respect to a non-owned automobile. (1) the named insured. 
(2) any relative Out only with respect to a private passenger automobile or trailer 
provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) the other actual use 
thereof is with the permission, or reasonably believed to be with the permis 
sion. of the owner and is within the scope of sucft permission, and 
(3) any other person or organization not owning or hiring the automobile, but 
only with respect to his or its liability because of acts or omissions of an 
insured under (b) (1) or (2) above. 
The insurance afforded under Part 1 applies separately to each insured against whom 
claim is made or suit is brought, but the inclusion herein of more than one insured 
shall not operate to increase the limits of the company s liability 
(2) the company insured all private passenger, farm and utility automobiles own 
ed by the named insured on the date of such acquisition and the named in-
sured notifies the company within 30 days and during the policy period of 
such acquisition of his eiectton to make this and no other policy issued by the 
company applicable to such automobile, or (d) a temporary substitute automobile. 
"temporary substitute automobile" means any automobile or trailer, not owned by 
the named insured, while temporarily used with the permission oi the owner as a sub-
stitute tor the owned automobile or trailer whenwithdrawn from normal use because 
of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. 
"non-owned automobile" means an automobile or trailer not owned by or furnished 
for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative other than a temporary 
substitute automobile. 
"private passenger automobile" means a four wheel private passenger, station wagon 
or jeep type automobile. 
"tarm automobile" means an automobile of the truck type with a load capacity of 
fifteen hundred pounds or less not used for business or commercial purposes other 
than farming; 
"utility automobile" means an automobile, other than a farm automobile, with a load 
capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less of the pick-jjp body, sedan delivery or panel 
truck type not used for business or commercial purposes; 
"trailer' means a trailer designed for use with a private passenger automobile, if not 
being used tor business or commercial purposes with other than a private passenger, 
farm or utility automobile, or a farm wagon or farm implement while used with a \arm 
automobile; 
"automobile business" means the business or occupation of selling, repairing, servic 
tng. storing or parking automobiles; 
"use" of an automobile includes the loading and unloading thereof, 
"war" means war, wnether or not dectared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revo-
lution, or any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing. 
Exclusions. This policy does not apply under Part I: 
(a) to any automooiie while used as a public or livery conveyance, but this exclusion 
does not apply to the named insured with respect to Dodiiy injury or property 
damage wmch results from the named insured's occupancy of a non-owned auto-
mobile other than as the operator thereof; 
(b) to bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of 
the insured; 
(d to bodily injury or property damage with respect to which an insured under this 
policy is also an insured under a nuclear energy liability policy issued by 
Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association. Mutual Atomic Energy liability 
Underwriters or Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada, or would be an insured 
under any such policy but for its termination upon exhaustion of its limit of 
liability; 
(d) to bodily injury or prooefty damage arising out of the operation of farm machinery; 
(e) to bodily injury to any employee of tht insured arising out of and in the course of 
(1) domestic employment by tht insured, if benefits therefor are in whole or in 
part either payaoie or required to be provided under any worxmen's compensation 
law. or (2) other employment by tht insured; 
(f) to bodily injury to any fellow employee of tht insured injured in tht course of his 
employment if such iniury arises out of tht use of an automobile in tht business 
of his employer, but this exclusion does not apply to tht named insured with 
respect to iniury sustained by any such fellow employee; 
(g) to an owned automobile whiit used by any person while such person is employed 
or otherwise engaged in tht automobilt business, but this exclusion does not aooly 
to tht named insured, a resident of tht samt housahoid as tht named insured, a 
partnership in which tht named insured or such resident is a partner, or any 
partner, agent or employee of tht named insured, such resident or partnership; 
(h) to a non-owned automobile while maintained or used by any person while such 
person is employed or otherwise engaged in (1) the automooiie business of the 
insured or of any other person or organization, (2) any other business or occupation 
of the insured, but this exclusion (h) (2) does not apply to a private passenger auto-
mobile operated or xcupied by the named insured or by his private chauffeur or 
domestic servant or a trailer used therewith or with an owned automobile; 
(i) to injury to or destruction of (1) property owned or transported by the insured or 
(2) property rented to or in charge of tht insured other than a residence or 
private garage; 
(p to the ownership, maintenance, operation, use. loading or unloading of an automo-
bile ownership of which is acquired by the named insured during the policy period 
or any temporary substitute automobile therefor, if the ntmea insured has pur-
PART II - PERSONA! 
chased other automobile liability insurance aoplicable to such automobile for 
which a specific premium charge has bttn made. 
Financial Responsibility taw*. When this policy is certified as proof of financial resoon-
sibility for the future under the provisions of any motor vehicle financial responsibility 
law, such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury liability or for prop-
erty damage liability shall comply with the provisions of -such law to the extent of the 
coverage and limits of liability required by sucn law, but in no event in excess of the 
limits of liability stated in this policy. The insured agrees to reimburse the company 
for any payments made by the company which if would not have been obligated to 
make under tht terms of this policy except tht agreement contained in this 
paragraph. 
Limits of liability. The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations as 
applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's liability for ail damages, 
including damages tor care and loss of services, arising out of bodily injury sustained 
by one person as tht result of any one occurrence: the limit of such liability stated 
in the declarations as applicable to "each occurrence" is. subject to the above provi-
sion respecting each person, the total limit of the company's liability for ail such dam-
ages arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as tht result of 
any one occurrence. 
The limit of property damage liability stated in the declarations as aoplicable to 
"each occurrence" is the total limit of the company's liability for ail damages arising 
out of or injury to or destruction of all property of one or more persons ar organiza-
tions, including the loss of use thereof, as the result of any one occurrence. 
Other Insuranct. If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by Part i 
of this policy the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater prooortion 
of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bean to 
the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such 
toss, provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute auto-
mobilt or non-owned autemobile shall bt excess insurance over any other valid and 
collectible insurance. 
INJURY PROTECTION 
SECTION I 
idorsement and to ail of the provisions of the policy except as modified herein, as 
Hows: 
ECTIONI 
ERSQNAl INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
le Company will pay personal iniury protection benefits to or on behalf of each eligible 
lured person for: 
ia) medical expenses, b) work loss, c) funeral expenses, and d) survivor loss 
ith respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person caused by an 
:cident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, 
idusions 
his coverage does not aoply: 
i) to bodily iniury sustained by any person while occupying a motor vehicle which 
is owned by the named insured and which is not an insured motor vehicle: 
)) to bodily injury sustained by the named insured or any relative while occupying 
a motor vehicle which is owned by a relative and for which the security required 
by the Utah Automobile No-fault Insurance Act is not in effect: 
:) to bodily injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle 
without the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful posses-
sion of the insured motor vehicle; 
i) to bodily injury sustained by any person injured while occupying or, while a pedes-
trian through the use of any motor vehicle, other than the insured motor vehicle, 
for which the security required under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act 
is in effect: 
0 to bodily injury sustained by any person, if such person's conduct contributed to 
his injury under either of the following circumstances; 
(1) causing iniury to himself intentionally, or 
(2) while committing a felony; 
) to bodily injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle 
while located for use as a residence or premises: 
l) to-bodily injury due to war, whether or not deer""4 , civil war. insurrection, rebellion 
or revolution, or to any act or condition inciden ny of the foregoing; 
i \ t o bodily iniury resulting from the radioactive*, . ^ ic , explosive or other hazardous 
properties of nuclear material. 
i) to ffodily injury to any person who is entitled to payments or benefits under the 
provisions or Utah's I'S Workmen's Compensation Law. 
eftnitinns 
When used in reference to this coverage: "bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness 
ur disease, including death resulting tnerefrom; "- '^lole injured person means 
ns bodily injury caused by an (a) the named insured or any relative who . 
• accident involving the use of any motor vehit
 ?, 
(b) any other person who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident while 
(1) occupying the insured motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or 
(2) occupying any other motor vehicle, other than a public or livery conveyance, 
operated by the named insured or a relative, or 
(3) a pedestrian if the accident involves the use of the insured motor vehicle, 
funeral expenses" means funeral, burial or cremation expenses incurred; 
insured" means the named insured, the spouse, or other relative of the named insured 
ho resides in the same household as the named insured, including those who usually 
lake their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person 
sing the described motor venicie with the permission, either expressed or implied, 
\ the owner, 
insured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle with respect to which 
(a) the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy applies and for which a specific 
premium is charged, and 
(b) the named insured is reauired to maintain security under the provisions of the 
Utah Automobile No-fault Insurance Act; 
medical expenses" means the reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical, 
jrgicai. x-ray, dental and rehabilitation services, including prosthetic devices, necessary 
mouiance. hospital, and nursing services, and any nonmedical remedial care and 
eatment rendered in accordance with a recognized method of healing; it does not 
iciude exoenses in excess of those for a semi-private room, unless more intensive 
ire is medically required. 
motor vehicle means any vehicle of a kind required to be registered with the Division 
f Motor Vehicles of the Utah State Tax Commission under Title 41-1-19, Utah Code 
nnotated 1953 but excluding motorcycles; 
named insured" means the person or organization named in the declarations; 
occupying" means being in or upon a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator or 
ngaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding or alighting from a motor vehicle: 
pedestrian" means any person not occupying or riding upon a motor venicie, other 
lan any person occupying or riding upon a motorcycle, 
relative' means a spouse or any otner person related to the named insured by blood, 
larnage or adootion (including a ward or foster child) who is a resident of the same 
ousenoid as the named insured, or wno usually makes nis home :n tne same housencld 
ut temooraniy lives elsewhere: 
survivor loss' means condensation on account of the death of the eligible iniured 
erson: 
*orn loss" means (a) loss of income and loss of earning caoacity by the eligible injured 
lerson during his lifetime, from inaoiiity to work during a oeriod commencing three days 
ifter the date of the bodily iniury and continuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive 
teens thereafter, provided that if such eligible injured person s inability to work snail 
o continue for in excess of a total ot two consecutive weeks alter the date of the Dodily 
niurv. this three day elimination oeriod snail not be aopucaole: and (b) a soeciai dam-
iges allowance ior services aauany isneered ur exuenses .'aasonaui* mewreu i c ser-
vices that. :ut far the injury, the injured person .vouid *3«e performed far rv.s housenold 
::mmencmg not later than three days attar the *2te :f tne injury and continuing *sr a 
n3ximum ot 365 days thereafter, but if the person s :naoi!ity to perform these services 
;hall so continue for in excess of a total cf fourteen days after the date of iniury. this 
roitcy fenoo; nsrriiory 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during tne policy period and within 
the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada. 
Limits of Liability 
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds applicable, claims made 
or insured motor vehicles to which this coverage applies, the Company's liability for 
personal injury protection benefits with respect to bodily injury sustained by any one 
eligible injured person in any one motor vehicle accident, is limited as follows: 
1 . the maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed 52.000; 
2. the maximum amount payable for work loss is 
(a) eighty five percent of any loss of gross income and earning capacity, not t-
exceed the total of SI 50 per week: 
(b) Not exceeding $12.00 per day for services actually rendered or expenses reason 
ably incurred for serv ces that, but for the injury the injured person would hav_ 
performed for his household. 
3. the maximum amount payable for funeral expenses shall not exceed $1,000; 
4. the amount payaole for survivor loss is 52.000 and is payable only to natural 
persons who are the eligible injured person's heirs; 
5. any amount payable by the Company under the terms of this coverage shall be 
reduced by tne amount paid, payable, or required to be provided on account of 
such bodily injury 
(a) under any workmen's compensation plan or any similar statutory plan, other 
than Utah's Workmen's Compensation Plan. 
(b) by the United States or any of its agencies because of his or her being on 
active duty in the military services. 
(c) under any applicable deductible set forth in this endorsement or in the policy 
to which it is attached. 
Conditions 
A. Action Against Company. No action shall lie against the Company unless as a condition 
precedent thereto, there shall have been full compliance with all the terms of this 
coverage. 
8. Notice. In the event of an accident, written notice containing particulars sufficient 
to identify the eligible injured person, and also reasonably obtainable information 
respecting the time, place and circumstances of the accident shall be given by or 
on behalf of each eligible injured person to the Company or any of its authorized 
agents as soon as practicable. If any eligible injured person, his legal representative 
or his survivors shall institute legal action to recover damages for bodily injury against 
a person or organization who is or may be liable in tort therefor, a copy of the 
summons and complaint or other process served in connection with such legal action 
shall be forwarded as soon as practicable to the Company by such eligible injured 
Serson. his legal representative, or his survivors, ledical Reports; Proof of Claim. As soon as practicable the eligible injured person 
or someone on his behalf shall give to the Company written proof of claim, under 
oath if required, incit ing full particulars of the nature and extent of the injuries 
and treatment receiv/ |d contemplated, and such other information as may assist 
the Company in deter . . g the amount due and payable. The eligible injured person 
shall suomit to physical and mental examinations oy physicians selected oy the 
Company when and as often as the Company may reasonably require. 
0. Subrogation. In the event of any payment under this coverage, the Company is 
suorogated to the rights of the person to whom or for whose benefit such payments 
were made, to the extent of such payments, and such person must execute and 
deliver instruments a * * papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such 
rights. Such person si p nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
£. Reimbursement and *.. J Agreement. In the event of any payment to any person 
under this coverage: fi 
1. the Company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds 
of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights 
of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsioie 
for the bodily injury because of which such payment is made: and the Comoany 
shall have a lien to the extent of such payment, notice of which may be given 
to the person or organization causing such bodily injury, his agent, his insurer 
or a court having jurisdiction in the matter 
2. such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company ail rights of recovery 
which he shall have against such other person or organization because of such 
bodily injury; | 
3. such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do nothing after 
loss to prejudice such rights; 
4. such person shall execute and deliver to the Company instruments and papers 
as may be appropriate to secure the rights and obligations of such person and 
the Company established by this provision. 
F. Non-Duplication of Benefits; Other Insurance. No eligible injured person shall recover 
duplicate benefits for the Isame elements of loss under this or any similar insurance. 
In the event that an eligible injured person who is a named insured, a relative, 
or who is injured in an accident involving the use of an insured motor vehicle has 
other similar insurance available and applicable to the accident, the maximum 
recovery under alt such insurance shall not exceed the amount which would have 
been payaole under the provisions of the insurance providing the hignest dollar limit., 
and the Company shall not be liable for a zreater proportion of any loss to which 
this coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the 
applicable limits of liability of this coverage and such other insurance. In the event 
that an eligible injured person, other than a named insured, relative, or a person 
who is iniured in an accident involving the use of an insured motor vehicle, has 
other similar insurance available and aoplicable to the accident, the coverage provided 
under this endorsement shall be excess over such other insurance. 
SECTION II 
In consideration of the coverage afforded under Section I and the adiustment of applica-
ble rates: 
(a) anv amount payacie under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage snail 5e reaucea 
by the amount oi any^  personal iniury protection oenehts oaia zt pavaole under 
this or anv other automooiie insurance poucy oecause ot oodtiy injury sustained 
by an eligible iniured person: 
SECTION HI 
The premium for the policy lis based on rates which have been established in reliance 
upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by the provisions 
oi the Utan Autwrncoiie No rau»t insurance Act. in ;r.e event i ccu/t zi cemwetent 
jurisdiction declares. :r ent?is a judgment the effect of wnich is to render, the previsions 
of :ucn act invalid or unenforceable «n wno'? or "t part, the Comoany shall **3v* the 
r!?nt to recompute the premium payable for the policy and the orovisioirs of this 
endorsement shail be voidable cr subject to amendment at the option cf the Company. 
qua*e winasTorm hail wa'er flood malicious mischief or vandalism not or civil
 c< 
commotion, or coll iding with a bird or an ima l , snail not be deemed to be loss
 a 
caused by collision.
 m 
(2) To oay for loss caused by fire or l ightning to robes, wearing apparel and other
 u< 
personal effects whicn are the property of the named insured or a relative, while m 
such effects are in or upon the owned automobile. *• 
Coverage £—Coll ision. To oay for loss caused by collision to the owned automobile D' 
or to a non-owned automobile but only for the amount of each such loss in excess ° 
of the deductible amount stated in the declarations as applicable hereto. The t! 
deductible amount snail not apply to loss caused by a collision with another auto- " 
mobile insured by the company. ir 
Coverage F — f i n , U g h t n m f and Transportation. To pay for loss to the owned auto-
mobile or a non-owned automobile, caused (a) by fire or lightning, (b) by smoke or 
smudge due to a sudden, unusual and faulty operation of any fixed heating equipment ^ 
serving the premises in wnich the automobile is located, or ( d by the stranding, 
sinking, burning, collision or derai lment of any conveyance in or upon which the : 
automobile is being transported. j 
Cavera t t fi—Theft To pay for loss to the owned automobile or to a non-owned auto- t 
mobile caused by theft or larceny.
 (1 
C o v e r a f i H — C a s s i a e d Additional Coverage. To pay for loss to the owned automobile ( 
or a non-owned automobile caused by windstorm, hail, earthquake, explosion, not or 
civil commotion, or the forced landing or fall ing of any aircraft or its parts or equip- ( 
ment, flood or rising waters, malicious mischief or vandalism, external discharge or 
leakage of water except loss resulting from ram, snow or sleet whether or not wind-
driven-, provided, with resoect to each automobile $25 shall be deducted from each 
loss caused by malicious mischief or vandalism. ( 
Cevera f t I—Towing and Labor Costs. To pay for towing and labor costs necessitated 
by the disablement of the owned automobile or of any non-owned automobile, pro-
vided the labor is performed at the place of disablement. I 
Supplementary Payments. In addition to the applicable limit of liability: (aJ to reimburse the insured for transportation expenses incurred during the period 
commencing 48 hours after a theft covered by this policy of the entire auto- ( 
mobile has been reported to the company and the police, and terminating when ( 
the automobile is returned to use or the company pays for the loss; provided 
that the company shall not be obligated to pay aggregate expenses in excess of I 
$10 per day or totaling more than $300 . I (b) to pay general average and salvage charges for which the insured becomes 
legally liable, as to the automobile being transported. i 
Definitions. The definitions of "named insured", "relat ive", "temporary substitute 
automobile", "private passenger automobile", " farm automobile", "uti l i ty auto-
mobile", "automobile business", "war" , and "owned automobile" in Part I apply i 
to Part I I I , but "owned automobile" does not include, under Part I I I . (1) a trai ler 
owned by the named insured on the effective date of this policy and not described 
herein, or (2) a trailer ownership of which is acquired during the policy period 
unless the company insures ail private passenger, farm and utility automobiles and 
trailers owned by the named insured on the date of such acquisition and the 
named insured notifies the company during the policy period or within 30 days 
after the date of such acquisition of his election to make this and no other policy 
issued by the company applicable to such trailer. 
Coverage J—Uninsured Motorists (Damages for Bodily Injury). To pay all sums which 
the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages 
from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sick-
ness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily 
injury/ ' sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided, for the purposes 
of this coverage, determination as to whether the insured or such representative is 
legally entitled to recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be 
made by agreement between the insured or such representative and the company or, 
if they fail to agree, by arbitrat ion. 
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally responsible 
for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the insured and the company, 
of the issues of liability of such person or organization or of the amount of dam-
ages to which the insured is legally entit led unless such judgment is entered pur-
suant to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of the company. 
Definitions. The definitions under Part I, except the definition of "insured," apply 
to Part IV. and under Part IY: 
" insured" means: 
(a) the named insured and any relat ive; (b) any other person while occupying an insured automobile; and (c) any person, with respect to damages he is entit led to recover because of bodily 
injury to which this Part applies sustained by an insured under (a) or (b) above. 
The insurance afforded under Part IV applies separately to each insured, but the 
inclusion herein of more than one insured shall not operate to increase the l imits of 
the company s liability. 
" Insured auto m o t Me" means: 
(a) an automobile described in the policy for which a specific premium charge indi-
cates that coverage ts afforded, 
(b) by a private passenger, farm or utility automobile, ownership of which is acquired 
by the named insured during the policy period, provided 
(1) it replaces an insured automobile as defined in (a) above, or 
(2) the company insures under this coverage all private passenger, farm and utility 
automobiles owned by the named insured on the date of such acquisition and the 
named insured notifies the company during the policy period or within 30 days 
after the date of such acquisition of his election to make the Liability and Unin-
sured Motorist Coverages under this and no other policy issued by the company 
applicable to such automobile. 
c) a temporary substitute automobile for an insured automobile as defined in (a) or 
b) above, and 
iur (me iidimaiHiiis, using or navmg uu5i3Qv oi saiQ automoone win *ne oermission 
c* »*e "amed insured and within tne scooe or such oermission 'b) with resoect to 
 non-owned automobile, the named insured and any relative wniie using sucn auto-
ooiie, provided his actual operation or (if he is not ooerating) the other actual 
use thereof is with the permission, or reasonably believed to oe with the per-
mission, of the owner and is within the scope of such permission, 
"non-owned autaaobile" means a private passenger automobile or trailer not owned 
by or furnished tor the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, 
otner than a temporary substitute automobile, wnde said automooiie or trailer is in 
the possession or custody of the insured or is being operated by him; 
"loss'* means direct and accidental loss of or damage to (a) the automobile, indue 
mg its equipment, or (b) otner insured property, 
"collision" means collision of an automobile covered by this policy with another 
.object or with a vehicle to which it is attacned or by upset of such automobile; 
"trailer" means a trailer designed for use with a private passenger automobile, if not 
being used for business or commercial purposes with other than a private passenger, 
farm or utility automobile, and if not a home, office, store, display or passenger trailer. 
Exclusions. This policy does not apply under Part III-
(a) to any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, 
(b) to loss due to war; (c) to loss to a non-owned automobile arising out of its use by the insured while 
he is employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business; (d) to loss to a private passenger, farm or utility automobile or trailer owned by the 
named insured and not described in this policy or to any temporary substitute 
automobile therefor, if the insured has other valid and collectible insurance 
against such loss; (e) to damage which is due and confined to wear and tear, freezing, mechanical or 
electrical breakdown or fai lure, unless such damage results from a theft covered 
by this policy-, (f) to tires, unless damaged by f ire, malicious mischief or vandalism, or stolen or 
unless the loss be coincident with and from the same cause as other loss covered 
by this policy-, 
(g) to loss due to radioactive contamination; 
(h) under Coverage E. to breakage of glass if insurance with respect to such breakage 
is otherwise afforded. 
Limit of Liability. The limit of the company s liability for loss shall not exceed 
the actual cash value of the property, or if the loss is of a part thereof the 
actual cash value of such part, at t ime of loss, nor what it would then cost to 
repair or replace the property or such part thereof with other of like kind ana 
quality, nor, with respect to an owned automobile described in this policy, the 
applicable l imit of liability stated in the declarations, provided, however, the limit 
of the company's liability (a) for toss to personal effects arising out of any one occur-
rence is S I 0 0 . and (b) for loss to any trailer not owned by the named insured is $500 . 
Other Insurance. If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by Part 
I I I of this policy, the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater 
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability of this policy bears to 
the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against 
such loss; provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute 
automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid 
and collectible insurance. 
(d) a non-owned automobile while being operated by the named insured; and the term 
"insured automobile" includes a trailer while being used with an automobile described 
in ( a ) , (b ) , (c) or (d) above, but shall not include: 
(1) any automobile or trailer owned by a resident of the same household as the 
named insured, 
(2) any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, or 
(3) any automobile while being used without the permission of the owner, 
"uninsured automobile" includes a trailer of any type and means: 
(a) an automobile or trailer with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of 
which there ts, in at least the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law 
of the state in which the insured automobile is principally zaraged. no bodily injury 
liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with respect 
to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such automobile or 
with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy appli-
cable at the time of the accident but the company writing the same denies coverage 
thereunder, or 
(b) a hit-and-run automobile; 
but the term "uninsured automobile" shall not include: 
(1) an insured automobile or an automobile furnished for the regular use of the 
named insured or a relative, 
(25 an automobile or trailer owned or operated by a self-insurer within the meaning of 
any motor vehicle financial responsibility law, motor carrier law or any similar taw. (3) an automobile or trailer owned by the United States of America. Canada, a state. 
a political subdivision of any such government or an agency of any of the fore-
going, (4) a land motor vehicle or trailer if operated on rails or crawler-treads or while 
located for use n a residence or premises and not as a vehicle, or (5) a tarm type tractor or equipment designed for use principally off public roads, 
except while actually upon public roaos. 
"hit-and-fun automobile" means an automobile which causes bodily injury to an in-
sured arising out of physical contact of such automobile with the insured or with an 
automobile wnich the insured is occupying at the time of the accident, provided (a) 
there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or the owner of such 
"hit-and-run automobile", (b) the insured or someone on his behalf shall have report-
ed the accident within 2 4 hours to a police, peace or judicial officer or to the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed with the company within 30 cays 
thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or his legal representative has a 
cause or causes of action arising out of such accident for damages against a person 
or persons whose identity is unascertamabie. and setting forth the facts in support 
thereof; and ( d at the company s request, the insured or his legal representative 
makes available for inspection the automobile which the insured was occupying at 
the t ime of the acc ident 
PART IV - PROTECTION AGAINST UNINSURED MOTORISTS 
iceupyitif" means in or upon or entering into or alighting from. 
state includes the District of Columbia, a territory or possession of the United 
ates, and a province of Canada. 
(elusions. This policy does not apply under Part IV-
) to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile (other than an insured 
automobile) Owned by the named insured or a relative, or through being struck 
by such an automobile: 
) to bodily injury to an insured with respect to which such insured, his legal repre-
sentative or any person entitled to payment under this coverage shall, without 
written consent ol the company, mane any settlement with any person or organ-
ization who may be legally liable therefor; 
) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen s compensation or 
disability benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a self insurer 
under any worxmen s compensation or disability benefits law or any similar law 
mits of Liability. 
) The limit of liability for uinsured motorists coverage stated in the declarations as 
plicaole to "each person' is the limit of the company s liability for all damages. 
eluding damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by 
e person as the result of any one accident and. subiect to the above provision 
specting each person, the limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable 
'each accident' is the total limit of the company's liability for all damages, mclud-
I damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by two or 
ore persons as the result of any one accident. 
) Any amount payable under the terms of this Part because of bodily injury sustained 
an accident by a person who is an insured under this Part shall be reduced by 
) all sums paid on account of such bodily injury by or on benaif of (i) the owner or 
operator of the uninsured automobile and (11) anv other person or organization 
jointly or severally liable together with sucn owner or operator for sucn bodily 
iniury including ail sums paid under Coverage A and 
I the amount paid and the present value ot ail amounts payable on account of such 
bodily injury under any workmen s compensation law. disability benefits law or 
any similar law 
I Any payment made under this Part to or for any insured shall be aoolied m reduc-
n ot the amount ot damages wmen he may oe emitted to recover from any person 
tured under Coverage A 
) The comoany snail not be obligated to oay under this coverage that part of the 
mages which the 'nsured may be entitled *i "cover '-cm t*»e cwner zr aperator of 
uninsured automobile wnich represents sxoenses for medical services paid or pay-
ie unrjer Part II 
Other Insurance. With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an auto-
mobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under Part IV shall apply only 
as excess insurance over any other simirar insurance available' to such insured and 
applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then 
apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the 
applicable limit of liability of such other insurance. 
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar 
insurance available to him and aoplicaole to the accident, the damages shall be 
deemed not to exceed the higher of the aoplicaole limits of liability of this insurance 
and such other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater propor-
tion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder 
bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such 
other insurance. 
Arbitration. If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not agree that 
such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or ooerator of an 
uninsured automooile because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to 
the amount of payment wmth may be owing under this Part. then, upon written 
demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such person and the comoany do 
not agree shad be settled by {arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may 
be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Such person and the company 
each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound by any award made by the arbi-
trators pursuant to this Pari. 
Trust Agreement. In the* event of payment to any person under this Part, 
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds of any 
settlement or judgment that p y result from the exercise of any rights of recovery of 
sucn person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily 
injury because of wmcf sucn payment is made-
!b) such oerson shall hold in trust for the benefit of the comoany all rights of recovery 
*n-crt he snail have against sjicn other person or organization because ot tne damages 
wnich are the subject of ctairh maoe uncer this Part 
(c) sucn oerson snail do whatever is prooer to secure and shall do nothing after loss 
to prejudice such rights-. 
(dJ if reouested in writing by the company, such person shall take, through anv repre-
sentative designated by the comoany, sucn action as may be necessary or aopnpr.ate 
to recover sucn oayment as damages from such other person or organization, sucn 
action to be taken m the name of sucn person- in the event of a recovery the comoany 
shail ie 'eimaursed out zi such recovery 'or expenses, costs and attorneys fees 
•ncurred 5y it n connection therewith, 
(e» sucn oerson shall execute and deliver to the company such instruments and oaoers 
as mav be aooroonate to secure the nghts and ooligations of sucn person ana tnc 
company estaoiisned by tms jprovision. 
(Unless otherwise noted, conditions aoply to alt Parts.) 
1 . Policy Pent*. Territory. This policy aoplies only to accidents, occurrences and 
loss during the policy penod while the automooile is within the United States of Amer-
ica, its territories or possessions, of Canada, or is being transported between ports 
thereof. 
2 * Premium. !f the named insured disooses of, acquires swntrshto of, sr replace* 
a private passenger, farm or utility automobile or. with respect to Part lit. a trailer, 
any premium adiustment necessary shall be made as of the date of such change 
in accordance with the manuals in use by the company. The named insured shall, 
upon request, furnish reasonable proof of the number of such automobiles or trail* 
ers and a description thereof. 
3 . Netict. In the event of an accident, occurrence or loss, written notice contain-
ing particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable infor-
mation with respect to the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the names and 
addresses of the inured and of available witnesses, snail be given by or for the in-
sured to the comoany or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicaole. In the 
event of theft the insured shall also promptly notify the police. If claim is made or 
suit is brought against the insured, he shall immediately forward to the comoany every 
demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative. 
if. before the company makes payment of loss under Part IY. the insured or his legal 
representative shall institute any legal action for bodily injury against any person or 
organization legally responsible for the use of an automooile involved in the accident, 
a copy of the summons and complaint or other process served in connection with sucn 
legal action shall be forwarded immediately to the company by the insured or his legal 
representative. 
4 * Two or More Automobiles—Parts I, II and I I I . When two or more automobiles are 
insured hereunder the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each, but an auto-
mobile and a trailer attached thereto shall be held to be one automooile as resoects 
limits of liability under Part I of this policy, and seoarate automobiles under Part 111 
of this policy, including any deductible provisions applicable thereto. 
5 . Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured—Parts I art I I I . The-insured shall 
coooerate with the company and. upon the company s request, assist in making settle-
ments, in the conduct of suits and in enforcing any right of contribution or indemnity 
against any person or organization who may be liable to the insured because of bodily 
injury, property damage or loss with respect to which insurance is afforded under this 
policy; and the insured .shall attend hearings and trials and assist in securing and 
giving evidence and obtaining the attendance of witnesses. The insured shail not, 
except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur 
any expense other than for such immediate medical and surgical relief to others as 
shall be imperative at the time of accident 
Part IV. After notice of claim under Part IV, the comoany may require the msuied 
to take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to preserve his right to re-
cover damages from any person or organization alleged to be legally responsible for 
the bodily injury, and in any action against the company, the company may require 
the insured to 10m such person or organization as a party defendant. 
6 . Action Against Company—Part I. No action shall he against the comoany unless, 
as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the 
terms of this policy, nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have 
been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by 
written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company 
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such 
ludgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this policy 
to the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy No person or organization 
shall have any right under this policy to join the company as a party to any action 
against the insured to determine the insured's liability, nor shail the comoany be 
impleaded by the insured or his legal representative. Bankruptcy or insolvency of the 
insured or of the insured's estate shall not relieve the company of any of its obliga-
tions hereunder 
Parts I I , I I I and IV. No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition 
precedent thereto, there shail have been full compliance with ail the terms of this 
policy nor. under Part III, until thirty days after proof of loss is filed and the amount 
of loss is determined as provided in this policy. 
7 . Medical Reports: Proof and Payment of Claim—Part I I . As soon as practicable 
the injured person or someone on his behalf shall give to the company written proof 
of claim, under oath if required, and shall, after each request from the company, 
execute authorization to enaoie the comoany to obtain medical reoorts and copies of 
records. The injured person shall submit to physical examination b> physicians selected 
by the company when and as often as the company may reasonaoly require. 
The company may pay the injured person or any person or organization rendering 
the services and such payment shall reduce the amount payable Hereunder for such 
injury Payment hereunder shall not constitute an admission of liability of any person 
or exceot hereunder, of the company 
8 . Insured's Duties in Event of Loss—Part I I I . In the event of loss the insured shall-
(a) protect the automobile, whether or not the loss is covered by this policy, and any 
further loss due to the insured s failure to protect shall not be recoverable under 
this policy; reasonable expenses incurred in affording sucn protection shall be 
deemed incurred at the company s request: 
(b) promptly notify the police if your car is stolen: 
(c) permit us to inspect and appraise the damaged property before its repair or disposal: 
(d) file with the company, within 91 days after loss, his sworn proof of loss in such 
form and including such information as the company may reasonaoly require and 
shall, upon the company s request, exhibit the damaged property and submit to 
examination under oath. 
9 . Proof of Claim* Medical Reports—Part IV. As soon as practicaole. the insured or 
other person making claim shall give to the company written proof of claim, under " 
oath if required, including full particulars of the nature and extent of the injuries,' 
treatment, and other details entering into the determination of the amount payable. 
The insured and every other person making clain* ;haJ! submit ta cxam:na!:cr5 un$sf 
oath by any person named by the company and subscribe the same, as often as may 
reasonably be required. Proof of claim shall be made upon forms furnished by the 
company unless the company shall have failed to furnish such forms within 15 days 
after receiving notice of claim. 
The injured person shall submit to physical examinations by physicians selected by 
ttie company when and as often as the company may reasonably require and he, or in 
the event of his incapacity his legal representative, or in the event of his death his 
legal representative or the person or persons entitled to sue therefor, shail uoon each 
request from the company execute authorization to enaoie the company to obtain 
medical reports and copies of records. 
1 0 . Appraisal—Part HI. If the insured and the company fail to agree as to the 
amount of loss, either may, within 60 days after proof of loss is filed, demand an ap-
praisal of the loss. In such event ttie insured and the company shall each select a 
competent appraiser, and the appraisers shail select a competent and disinterested 
umpire. The appraisers shail state separately the actual cash value and the amount of 
loss and failing to agree shall submit their differences to the umoire. An award in 
writing of any two shall determine the amount of loss. The insured and the comoany 
shail each pay his chosen appraiser and shall bear equally the other expenses of the 
appraisal and umpire. 
The company shail not be heid to have waived any of its rights by any act relating 
to appraisal. 
1 1 . Payment of Loss—Part I I I . The comoany may pay for the loss in money; or may 
repair or replace the damaged or stolen prooerty; or may, at any time before the loss 
is paid or the property is so replaced, at its expense return any stolen prooerty to the 
named insured, or at its option to the address shown in the declarations, with payment 
for any resultant damage thereto; or may take all or such part of the property at the 
agreed or appraised value but there shail be no abandonment to the company. The com-
pany may settle any claim for loss either with the insured or the owoer of the property. 
Part IY. Any amount due is payable (a) to the insured, or (b) if the insured be a minor 
to his parent or guardian, or (c) if the insured be deceased to his surviving spouse, 
otherwise (d) to a person authorized by law to receive such payment or to a person 
legally entitled to recover the damages which the payment represents; provided, the 
company may'at its option pay any amount due in accordance with division (d) hereof 
1 3 . No Benefit to Bailee—Part I I I . The insurance afforded by this Policy shall not 
inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any earner or other bailee for hire liable 
for loss to the automobile. 
1 3 . SubroMtion—Parts I and I I I . In the event of any payment under this policy, the 
company shall be subrogated to all the insured's rights of recovery therefor against 
any person or organization and the insured shail execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. The insured shail do 
nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
1 4 . Changes. Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or by any 
other person shall not effect a waiver or a change in any part of this policy or estop 
the company from asserting any right under the terms of this policy; nor shall the 
terms of this policy be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a 
part of this policy, signed by a duly authorized representative of the company 
1 5 . Assignment. Assignment of interest under this policy shail not bind the company 
until its consent is endorsed hereon; if. however, the insured named in Item I of the 
declarations, or his spouse if a resident of the same household, shall die. this policy 
shall cover (1) the survivor as named insured, (2) his legal representative as named 
insured but only while acting within the scope of his duties as such. (3) any person 
having proper temporary custody of an owned automobile, as an insured, until the 
appointment and qualification of such legal representative, and (4) under division I 
of Part II any person who was a relative at the time of such death. 
1 6 . Cancelation. This policy may be canceled by the insured named in Item 1 of the 
declarations by surrender thereof to the company or any of its authorized agents or 
by mailing to the company written notice stating when thereafter the cancelation shall 
be effective This policy may be canceled by the company by mailing to the insured 
named in Item I or the declarations at the address shown in this poltcy written notice 
stating when not less than ten days thereafter such cancelation shall be effective The 
mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice. The time of the sur-
render or the effective date and hour of cancelation stated in the notice shall become 
the end of the policy period. Delivery of such written notice either by such insured 
or by the company shall be equivalent to mailing. 
If such insured cancels, earned premium shail be comouted in accordance with the 
customary short rate table and procedure. If the comoany cancels, earned premium 
shall be comouted pro rata. Premium adjustment may be made either at the time can-
celation is effected or as soon as practicable after cancelation becomes effective, but 
payment or tender of unearned premium is not a condition of cancelation. 
1 7 - Declarations. By acceptance of this policy, the insured named in Item I of the 
declarations agrees that the statements in the declarations are his agreements and 
representations, that this policy is issued in reliance upon the truth of such repre-
sentations and that this policy embodies all agreements existing between himself and 
the company or any of its agents relating to this insurance. 
In Witness Whereof, the company has caused this policy to be signed by its president and secretary, but this policy shall not be valid unless completed by the attachment 
hereto of a declarations page designated as Part Two and countersigned on the aforesaid declarations page by a duly authorized representative of the company. 
The msurpd is hereov notified that by virtue of this poiicv he is a memoer of the Sear River Mutual Insurance Comcany and that 'he annual Tteetng cr the comoany is leid 
at the home orfice in Salt Lake City. Utah on the first Saturday in Marcn of each year at 11 CO a m for the purpose or transacting the general business of the comoany and for 
the election of directors. As a policyholder you are entitled to vote m person at the meeting or by proxy. This notice snail be deemed full notice ot the annual meeting. 
&****+jr 
Secretary 
Rev. 10 32 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST^TE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Spencer J. Hind and Judy R. Hind, No. 870058 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
F I L E D 
v. November 5, 1987 
Carmen I. Quilles aka Carmen Gomez 
Quilles, and Porfidia Torres, 
Defendants and Respondents# 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, 
Intervening Plaintiff and __^ 
Respondent. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Frederick N. Green, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Thomas A. Duff in, Salt Lake Cit;y, for Respondents 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment granted to 
their insurer, Bear River Mutual Insurance |Company ("Bear 
River"), intervening plaintiff• 
Plaintiffs were injured while riding on their 
motorcycle, when they collided with an autdmobile driven by 
defendant Quilles. Quilles was uninsured. | Plaintiffs had not 
insured the motorcycle ;they were riding, biit had an insurance 
policy issued by Bear^River that covered tv^ o automobiles owned 
by plaintiffs. The policy contained uninsured motorist cover-
age, as described under Utah Code Ann. § 41J-12-21.1 (1981). 
Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled tjo benefits under the 
uninsured motorist coverage of that policy for damages incurred 
in the collision with Quilles. 
The policy issued by Bear River specifically excludes 
such coverage for any vehicle owned by plaihtiffs not included 
in the policy and for which no premium was baid. In our recent 
case of Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 67 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Oct. 6, 1987), we held th^t neither the 
statute nor public policy forbids restrictijsns of uninsured 
motorist coverage such as the one contained in this policy. 
That case is controlling on plaintiffs' firfet issue on appeal. 
Inasmuch as all other issues depend on a finding of coverage 
under the policy, we do not address them. The judgment is 
affirmed. Costs to Bear River. 
